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Lower Stumpage Costs by Using Probabilistic and Skewed Bidding 
Methods: A Case Study of Timber Sales on the Lolo National 
Forest (60 pp.) 
Probabilistic and skewed bidding techniques can significantly 
lower a wood products firm's stumpage costs and increase its 
profits. Results from the study of 114 sales on the Lolo National 
Forest show that 16 percent of the volume sold, having average 
sale characteristics, could have been purchased at 57 percent 
of the average bid price per thousand board feet (MBF) by using 
probabilistic bidding methods. If the optimal skewed bid was 
submitted on each of 60 closed sales, savings from the amount 
bid to the amount paid of up to $72.51 per MBF (1980 $) could 
have been realized. 
Selling value and cost equations, based on sale characteristics, 
for a hypothetical firm are developed to determine the timber 
value remaining to be distributed between the stumpage bid and 
profit. Probabilities of obtaining a specified volume of timber 
at various profit margins are calculated and the optimal profit 
margin determined. The optimal bid for each species, using 
linear programming, is determined to maximize the difference 
between the bid and the expected payment. The constraints of 
base ratesj advertised rates, base indices and projected indices 
are used to factor in the effects of escalation clauses. 
The results provide a methodology for more profitable timber 
procurement and identify when the methodology may be used most 
effecti vely. 
Director: David H. Jackson 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Wood product manufacturing firms recently have had low profit 
margins, and some have had substantial losses. Low profits and losses 
result from low market prices and/or high costs. A firm has little 
control over market prices; therefore, it must reduce costs to be 
competitive. Stumpage costs are a significant portion of total wood 
n 
product production costs. This is especially true in the case of 
higher valued species such as white and ponderosa pine. The lower 
the average price paid for similar timber the greater the profit for 
the firm. As long as the lumber selling price is greater than the 
variable costs of production, relatively constant production and timber 
supplies should be maintained to cover fixed costs. For many firms 
there are few alternatives to the National Forests for their supply 
of timber. The purchase of National Forest timber is primarily by 
sealed bid or oral auction. The high bid is seldom rejected as long 
as it is greater than or equal to the advertised rate, which is based 
on a Forest Service appraisal. Historically, the total bid price 
has been distributed among the species sold in each sale. That is, 
each species is bid on separately, but the total bid is the basis 
for contract award. Large sales are sold predominantly with payment 
for each species based on scaled volume at the mill. 
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The competitive nature of bidding suggests that the company with 
the best bidding strategy will have lower stumpage costs and higher 
profits than its competitors. Bidding strategy for National Forest 
timber is based primarily on two objectives: 
1) Minimize the average bid price per thousand board feet for 
timber of similar product selling price and stump-to-market 
costs while obtaining the required volume of timber. 
2) Maximize the difference between the amount bid and the amount 
paid (or minimize if payment is greater than bid). 
The first objective suggests the need for a model to assist the pur­
chaser in arriving at a bid price that has the optimal combination 
of probability of being the high bid and probability of profit if 
the bid is the high one. The second objective consists of skewing 
the bid by placing an abnormally high proportion of the total bid 
on a particular species, anticipating the scale (payment) volume will 
be less than the cruise (bid) volume. 
Objecti ve 
The objective of the following analysis is to determine the 
effectiveness of using probabilistic bidding, regression analysis 
and linear programming to meet the above bidding objectives. The 
three techniques are applied to 54 open and 60 closed sales on the 
Lolo National Forest. 
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In this study of timber sales on the Lolo National Forest, the 
potential effectiveness of probabilistic and skewed bidding techniques 
for timber procurement are examined. Selling value and cost equations 
are developed which include the factors of Lumber price, tree diameter, 
slope, logging method, haul distance, volume per acre and total sale 
vo1ume. 
The selling value and cost equations are used to determine a 
net value before profit and stumpage costs. The probability of sale 
award at various profit levels, after actual bid prices are subtracted, 
is calculated and the maximum profit level for obtaining sufficient 
volume for a hypothetical firm is determined. This is done on both 
a bid basis and an expected payment basis and is compared to regression 
ana 1ys i s. 
The optimal bid for each species, using linear programming, is 
determined to maximize the difference between the bid and the expected 
payment. The optimal bid distribution assumes the firm has done an 
extensive cruise, accurately determining the scale volume of each 
species. The constraints of base rates, advertised rates, base indices 
and projected indices are used to factor in the effects of escalation 
clauses. A procedure using seasonal and cyclical indices is defined 
for estimating the projected indices. 
The results provide a methodology for more profitable timber 
procurement and identify when the methodology may be used most 
effectively. 
CHAPTER TWO 
PROBABILISTIC AND REGRESSION BIDDING MODELS 
Chapter Two begins with a review of the literature concerning 
probabilistic and regression models for determining the optimal bid 
and predicting competitors' bids. The source and type of data used 
in the analysis is then described. Selling value and production cost 
formulas are developed to determine the net value remaining for stump­
age and profit. Probabilistic and regression models are described 
and the results of using each are compared to each other and to actual 
company results. 
Literature Review 
Probabilistic bidding models are based on optimizing the prob­
ability of bid acceptance and profit if the bid is accepted. The 
optimum bid is the one that maximizes the following equation: 
E(X) = P(X) Z(X) where: X = amount of the bid 
Z(X) = estimated profit if accepted 
P(X) = probability of bid X being accepted 
E(X) = expected profit of a bid of X 
P(X) is calculated by first calculating the percentage a competitor's 
bid exceeds the subject company's estimated direct costs for several 
prior projects. Second, the number of projects that fall below spec­
ified ranges of percent overbid (over cost) is determined. The per­
centage (probability) of bids below each percent overbid range is 
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then determined. The estimation of the probability is subject to 
two assumptions: 1) the competitor's estimates of direct costs bear 
a constant relationship to the bidder's estimates of direct costs, 
and 2) the competitor will act in the future as he has in the past 
(Morse, 1975). 
If several unknown bidders are encountered, the average bidder 
approach is often used. This approach makes the above calculations 
using the "average" bidder, and raises the probability [P(X)] to the 
n power where n is the number of unknown bidders. The average bidder 
approach is inherently biased and tends to overestimate the actual 
chances of winning. The size of the error varies directly with the 
standard deviation of the averaged opponents' bids and with the number 
of opponents. To neutralize the bias, P(X)n is multiplied by the 
correction factor [I - (S.D./P(X))^J /^where S.D. is the standard 
deviation (Kottas, 1976). 
The bidder's own estimate of costs frequently must be corrected 
for bias by determining the average difference between cost estimates 
and actual costs, and the variability of those differences, for past 
projects awarded to the bidder. Constraints on the amount of contracts 
accepted due to physical or financial resource limitations, when simul­
taneously bidding on more than one contract, may be included through 
nonlinear programming (Friedman, 1956). Other models attempt to incor­
porate the potential loss to the firm resulting from failure to win 
a contract (Edelman, 1965). If the cost of developing a bid is high, 
pay-off tables for two stages of bid development may be used. In 
the first stage, prior probability of success computations can be 
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utilized to determine whether or not to proceed with pay-off tables 
and bid formulation (Paranka, 1969). 
Literature concerning probabilistic bidding has generally been 
concerned with situations, such as construction, where the award is 
to the lowest bidder. In these situations, greater bid-to-cost ratios 
yield greater profit, but with less probability of bid acceptance. 
The opposite situation occurs in bidding for timber where the highest 
bidder is awarded the contract. In this case, greater bid-to-net 
value ratios yield lower profit, but with greater probability of bid 
acceptance. Net value is defined as selling price less total non-
stumpage expenses. The literature is not very specific as to the 
difference between using profit margin and contribution margin (price 
minus variable costs) and the implications of cost-volume-price (CVP) 
relationships. Another factor that complicates both probabilistic 
bidding and CVP relationships is that the stumpage unit of measure 
(MBF) is not a constant unit because it varies, nonlinearly, with 
tree diameter and height (i.e., taper). Therefore, per unit variable 
costs, prices, profits and contribution margins vary with timber sale 
characteristics. The assumptions noted previously are much less 
applicable to the timber purchase situation. The primary reason is 
that net value estimates require both an estimate of costs and an 
estimate of future market value. Such future market value estimates 
induce a much higher variation in the estimates of net value due to 
differing expectations. 
Method Introduction 
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A large sample of observations is necessary to reliably calculate 
the probability that an event will occur. Also, because of the cycli­
cal nature of the wood products market, a lengthy time period must 
be observed to determine true averages. One hundred fourteen sales 
were selected from the 157 timber sales, greater than 500 MBF in size, 
sold from 1974 through 1983 on the Lolo National Forest. Selection 
was based primarily on accessibility of information. Sixty of the 
114 selected sales have been completed and closed, most of which were 
sold prior to 1980. The 54 open sales and the 60 closed sales made 
up two study subpopulations. Sale data collected included: cruise 
volume by species, average diameter by species, volume per acre cut, 
average percent slope, percent of volume to be skyline logged, 
appraised haul miles and destination, purchaser credits, sale date 
and contract term by quarter, and whether the sale was a Small Business 
Administration (SBA) set-aside. Bid data collected included bids 
by bidder and species and Forest Service values for manufacturing 
costs, logging costs, appraised rates, base rates and base indices. 
Data for the closed sales included scale volume and actual money 
receipts and credits. The Western Wood Products Association's quart­
erly price index, by species group, is used as a basis for selling 
price calculations. All dollar figures were adjusted by the GNP 
Implicit price deflator to a constant 1980 dollar. 
The supply Of timber for sale is not included in the analysis, 
but is assumed to be relatively constant over the long term. This 
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Is assumed because of Forest Service policies of sustained yield and 
community stability. In practice, the volume of timber sold on the 
Lolo has declined somewhat but private land harvest has increased 
(see Graph 1 for Lolo N. F. large-sale volume, 1974 through 1983). 
Graph 1 
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To determine the effectiveness of probabilistic bidding methods 
a hypothetical firm (Firm X) located at Superior, Montana with a hypo­
thetical, but realistic, cost structure is assumed to be the bidding 
firm (see Table 1 for assumptions related to the firm). The critical 
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value necessary Is an estimate of the net value remaining after 
estimated nonstumpage costs are subtracted from projected long-term 
selling value. Both costs and selling values are estimated by firms. 
Therefore, it is not necessary for the values to be perfectly accurate 
for the analysis to be valid. 
Table 1 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT FIRM X 
1) Firm X's Long-Term Average Cost Structure (Constant 1980 $): 
$/MBF Percent Annual 
Selling value $ 320 100 7. 
Variable costs: 
Stumpage $ 80 
Other 112 
192 60 
Contribution margin 128 40 7. 
Fixed costs 96 30 $ 960,000 
Profit margin $ 32 10 7. 
Normal capacity (827. from sales > 500 MBF) 10,000-MBF 
2) Firm X is eligible for SBA set-aside sales 
Expected Sell Value Calculations 
Contract terms ranged from 0.5 to 6.75 years with an average 
term of 3.6 years. Because of the long period between purchase and 
final harvest, it is assumed bidding should be based on an expected 
long-term average price. The assumption for this analysis was that 
10-year period average prices, after adjustment for inflation and 
market cycles, would have no apparent trend. Regression lines in 
Graphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicate that price trends over the period were 
level for white and ponderosa pine but declined from two to three 
percent per year for other species groups. The cyclical nature of 
lumber prices causes trend lines to shift according to where in the 
cycle the data begins but the period defined is believed to be well 
balanced in the cycle. Therefore, the base long-term selling value 
for each species group was obtained by averaging the WWPA quarterly 
price indices for the 10-year period for each species group. 
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Graph 3 
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Graph 5 
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The second major factor in determining selling value is lumber 
grade, which is primarily a function of tree diameter. White/ponderosa 
pine and Douglas-fir/western larch are the species groups which have 
significant premiums added to the value due to increased grade recovery. 
For white/ponderosa pine, the formula "[1 + (-.4122 + .0217 x dbh)] 
x average long-term sell value" was used to adjust for grade differ­
ences. This formula was determined by regressing average percent 
select lumber for grade 2 logs (Davis, 1954), adjusted to a tree basis, 
with diameter class. This was done only through 18 inch dbh; therefore, 
it may not be applicable to areas with much greater average tree dia­
meters. The formula was then adjusted to the point where a 19 inch 
dbh was neutral. That is, greater diameters increased selling value, 
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while lesser diameters decreased value. The rationale for this is 
that the WWPA index is based on the average lumber mix which, in turn, 
is produced from the average diameter tree. The average white/ponderosa 
pine tree diameter was 17.7 inches, but an additional 1.3 inches was 
added to account for the fact that a certain percentage of ponderosa 
pine is lower-valued bull pine. The actual amount of bull pine is 
not identifiable from sale data, which is a cause for some error in 
valuing individual sales. 
The formula "[1 + (-.3145 + .0217 x dbh)] x average long-term 
sell value" was used for Douglas-fir/western larch. The formula deter­
mination was made through the same procedure as above with two excep­
tions. First, the average diameter of the species group was determined 
to be near 14.5 inches, which is the neutral diameter for the formula. 
Second, no adjustment for lower-valued subgroups was made. The WWPA 
average long-term price indices were used without adjustment for the 
other species groups. Unsound and dead volume was grouped together 
and valued at the lodgepole pine price index because the majority 
of the volume was dead lodgepole and the unsound white/ponderosa pine 
and Douglas-fir/western larch should be valued lower than sound wood. 
The third factor determining selling value on a log scale basis 
is the overrun factor. Overrun, on a tree basis, declines logarith­
mically with an increase in diameter. The overrun formula used was 
"[2 - .22 x LN(dbh)]" times the selling value obtained previously. 
Overrun may be increased through technological advances and management 
improvements. Some adjustment in the overrun factor will be required 
as advances and improvements are made. 
Estimated Cost Calculation 
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Cost data from industry are generally unavailable to outside 
users. A second alternative was to assume that the selling value 
less the actual bid, on a per MBF basis, was a reasonable estimate 
of costs. Multiple regression using the primary determinants of costs 
(diameter, slope, 7. skyline, volume/acre, haul miles, etc.) as 
independent variables and the residual of sell value minus bid as 
the dependent variable proved unsatisfactory with R Square values 
less than 0.5. A third alternative was to use Forest Service appraisal 
estimates. The regression lines in Graphs 6 and 7 indicate Forest 
Service cost estimates have increased approximately five percent per 
year in constant dollars. The difference between Forest Service 
appraised value and the actual bid was negatively correlated with 
Forest Service estimated logging and manufacturing costs (-.67 & -.63) 
and with the sale date (-.38). This indicates that Forest Service 
cost estimates may have been rising more rapidly than actual costs 
during the 10-year period; although, bidders' expectations of rapid 
and continuous lumber price escalation could have been a contributing 
factor. The graphs and the strong correlations do cast considerable 
doubt on the accuracy of Forest Service cost estimations because the 
wood products industry is mature with a moderate growth pattern where 
excessive cost pressures would not be expected. Note that the follow­
ing graphs are based on log scale volume and the previous graphs are 
based on lumber tally volume. Therefore, to compare the two sets 
of graphs, the previous set must be adjusted by an overrun factor. 
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The alternative selected was to use a published logging cost 
study (Withycombe, 1982) as a base for logging costs and Forest Service 
10-year average manufacturing cost estimates, all adjusted to 1980 
dollars. Simple regression formulas were developed for each variable 
and then combined into one formula. An average 10 percent before-tax 
profit on sales was included in the formulas for testing purposes. 
The testing and adjustment of the formulas was done to reduce signif­
icant bias toward any cost variable. This bias was minimized by 
adjusting the formulas to minimize the correlation of the error (net 
value minus actual bid) with each of the cost variables. 
Manufacturing costs per MBF (log scale) are primarily a function 
of diameter due to higher costs per MBF (lumber tally) of smaller 
diameter trees, which is only partially offset by higher overruns. 
Because of various log sizes per tree the cost declines linearly with 
tree diameter (even though costs may decline logarithmically with 
log diameter). The initial formula was developed by using regression 
of average Forest Service cost estimates with average diameter for 
each species. Because Douglas-fir and western larch are peeler species 
with a different cost structure and Firm X was assumed to be a sawmill, 
those species were excluded from the regression data. The final 
adjusted formula used for manufacturing costs per MBF was "(160 -
2.134 x dbh)". 
Withycombe's study was used to determine logging costs according 
to diameter class, logging method (ground skidding, cable yarding) 
and haul distance. An average 1000-foot skidding and yarding distance 
was assumed. The skidding and yarding costs were by log size class; 
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therefore, they were converted to tree size class by determining the 
approximate number of logs of each size class that would occur in 
each tree size class. The study identified costs on a cunit measure 
which required conversion to the MBF unit of measure. The results 
indicated that logging costs per MBF are approximately a function 
of the natural log of tree diameter. However, the study did not 
account for some other important variables, such as, slope, volume 
per acre cut, economies of scale (total sale volume) or potential 
excess purchaser credit granted for road construction. These other 
variables were included and adjusted to minimize the correlation of 
the variable coefficient with the net value error (net value minus 
bid). The final adjusted formula used for logging costs per MBF was 
"[(150 - 30 x LN(dbh)) x (1 + .003 x Slope*) x (1 + .0092 x %Skyline) 
- 6.6 x LN(Vol/ Acre) + .16 x Haul Miles + 35 - 6.2 x LN(Total Vol)]". 
Total cost per MBF was determined to be "Manufacturing Cost + Logging 
Cost - .21 x Purchaser Credit/MBF". The reduction for purchaser credit 
was required to minimize the correlation of the net value/bid difference 
with the amount of purchaser credit. This reduction suggests that 
Forest Service estimates of road costs may average 21 percent greater 
than actual costs. This is partially explained by the inclusion of 
profit in such estimates, which are based on previous road construction 
bids. 
Table 2 shows that the correlation between the error (calculated 
net value minus actual bid) and each cost or selling value variable 
is very low. This suggests the cost and selling value formulas are 
relatively unbiased toward any variable. Positive correlations 
indicate the calculated net values may be overstated and negative 
correlations may indicate understatement of net values in relation 
to the particular variable. The major positive correlations are with 
the sell value and volume percentage of white/ponderosa pine. This 
may be due to bull pine being a larger factor than anticipated. 
Table 2 
CORRELATIONS OF NET VALUE-BID DIFFERENCE WITH SALE VARIABLES 
Variable 
Weighted average dbh 
Slope % 
% Skyline logged 
Volume/acre 
Total sale volume 
Haul miles 
Date of sale 
Brush disposal deposits 
Purchaser credit/MBF 
Correlation 
-.0498 
-.0652 
-.0652 
-.0455 
-.0655 
-.0629 
.0863 
.0198 
-.0322 
Var i ab1e Correlation 
% white/ponderosa .0838 
% D.-fir/larch -.0660 
7. lodgepole .0276 
7. grand/subalpine fir -.1393 
Logging cost -.0746 
Manufacturing cost .0498 
Total cost -.0648 
Overrun .0546 
Sel1ing value .1027 
Haul mileage is the distance from the sale to the appraised 
destination. After the formulas were developed and the correlations 
computed, an additional haul cost was added for the distance from 
the appraised destination to the hypothetical firm's location. This 
cost was calculated at $.10 per MBF per mile since no additional un­
loading costs are required and only paved roads are traveled 
(Table 3). 
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Table 3 
ADDITIONAL HAUL COST 
(Appraised location to Firm X) 
Appraised Location 
Plai ns 
Missoula 
Thompson Fa 11s 
See ley Lake 
Mi les 
43 
57 
69 
105 
$/MBF 
$ 4.30 
5.70 
6.90 
10.50 
Probabi1istic Approach 
Except for "direct" (nonbid) sales, a firm cannot predict accur­
ately the number of bidders that will submit bids. Therefore, neither 
the single known competitor nor the average bidder approaches are 
very useful. The average bidder approach has drawbacks for two reasons: 
1) several firms often submit "speculative" minimum bids which may 
inconsistently lower the average bid, and 2) it is difficult to 
determine ahead of the bid submission deadline how many bidders are 
competing. Because the average bidder approach requires correction 
by adding the standard deviation of the bids (Kottas, 1976), the results 
become similar to those using the high bidder. The high bidder approach 
was used in the analysis because of greater simplification and the 
assumption that the number of bidders cannot accurately be determined 
prior to bidding. The probabilistic approach included four steps: 
1) net value estimation for each sale, 2) profit margin calculation 
if the actual bid were paid, 3) determination of the expected volume 
at various profit margins (i.e., probability of receiving the award 
times the total volume sold over the 10-year period), and 4) deter-
mi nation of the profit margin required to obtain the 10-year volume 
objective of the firm. 
Refer to Appendix B.l as each step is described. The net value 
per MBF was determined by subtracting the total estimated production 
cost from the selling value estimates determined in the previous sec­
tions. The profit margin was determined by subtracting the actual 
bid per MBF (stumpage value) from the net value and dividing the re­
mainder (expected profit) by the selling value per MBF. The sales 
were then arranged, according to profit margin, in ascending order. 
The expected volume, if Firm X bid at the various calculated profit 
margins, was determined by adding the volumes of all sales having 
profit margins greater than, or equal to, each profit margin level. 
The highest profit margin needed to obtain expected volume greater 
than the volume objective was determined to be the profit margin Firm 
X would base its bids on. Since Firm X is assumed to require 82,000 
MBF from National Forest Sales (> 500 MBF) over the 10-year period, 
the objective was determined to be one-half (41,000 MBF) for the 54-sale 
subpopulation and the remaining amount for the 60-sale subpopulation. 
The 50-50 split was chosen because total volume of both subpopulations 
are nearly equal (267,939 MBF and 256,280 MBF). Appendix B.l shows 
that a profit margin less than 20.7 percent is required to obtain 
41,943 MBF for the 54-sale subpopulation. Appendix B.2 shows that 
the 20.7 percent profit margin selected by the 54-sale subpopulation 
and applied to the 60-sale subpopulation would obtain 38,538 MBF. 
Regression Bid Prediction Approach 
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Hanssmann and Rivett (1959) suggest the use of linear regression 
analysis of past bid prices and independent factors that influence 
the prices to estimate probable competitor bid prices. Jackson and 
McQuillan (1979) developed a regression model which predicts stumpage 
price as a function of tree diameter, harvested volume per acre, logging 
method, harvest method, and lumber selling price (constant dollars). 
A second approach, using regression to predict competitors' bids, 
was compared to the pure probabilistic approach. The second approach 
included seven steps: 1) development of a regression formula to predict 
the bid per MBF in 1980 dollars (Table 4), 2) calculate actual bid-to-
predicted bid ratios, removing ratios greater than one because they 
would not have been awarded to Firm X, 3) calculate predicted bid-to-net 
value ratios, 4) determine the expected volume as done In the probab-
ilistic approach, 5) calculate the profit margin if the predicted 
bid were paid, 6) determine the minimum predicted bid-to-net value 
ratio required to obtain the 10-year volume objective, and 7) calculate 
the volume weighted average profit margin for sales with ratios less 
than, or equal to, the minimum ratio required in step 6. 
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Table 4 
REGRESSION EQUATION COEFFICIENTS 
(54-Sale Subpopulation) 
Coeff i c i ent 
-210.627 
3.305 
.296 
54.624 
.087 
.637 
9.333 
.899 
Standard Error t-Value 
-4.383 
1.702 
-2.757 
4.052 
1.141 
2.835 
2.004 
5.391 
DBH 
SKLN 
SBA 
ACSV 
PRCR 
LTVL 
ADVR 
Constant 48.057 
1.942 
.107 
13.481 
.076 
.225 
4.657 
. 167 
Adj. R-Square 
Standard Error 
F Value 
.779 
27.310 
26.957 
Where: 
DBH = ave. dbh per species, weighted by volume/species 
SKLN = percent of volume skyline logged 
SBA = dummy variable for small business administration 
set-aside sales (1 = set-aside, 2 = non-set-aside) 
ACSV = actual sell value per MBF (1980 $) at time of sale 
(used procedure similar to "Expected Selling Value", 
except cyclical values used rather than long-term ave.) 
PRCR = purchaser credit per MBF 
LTVL = natural log of the total sale volume 
ADVR = advertised rate per MBF 
Appendix C.l shows the bids predicted by the previous formula 
and the results of the previously itemized steps. The actual bid-to-
predicted bid ratios were calculated to identify and remove those 
sales which would not be awarded to the bidder if the regression formula 
was used as a basis for bidding. Twenty-one of the 54 sales had ratios 
greater than one and would not have been awarded to Firm X. The pre-
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dieted bid-to-net value ratios were calculated as a proxy for profit 
(i.e., the percentage of net value that would be bid verses the percent­
age that would be profit). The sales remaining after the previous 
elimination procedure were then arranged, according to predicted bid-
to-net value ratios, in descending order. The lower the ratio the 
greater the profit. The expected volume was calculated by adding 
the volumes of all sales with predicted bid-to-net value ratios less 
than, or equal to, each ratio level. Profit margins of the predicted 
bids were also calculated. Appendix C.l shows that a predicted bid-to-
net value ratio greater than 0.59 is required to obtain 42,425 MBF 
for the 54-sale subpopulation. Appendix C.2 shows the calculated 
values for the 60-sale subpopulation. To compare the probabilistic 
and regression approaches the profit margins of selected sales of 
the regression approach (=< 0.59 ratio) were averaged on a volume 
weighted basis. 
CVP Relationships 
Cost-volume-profit relationships are important, but were not 
analyzed thoroughly for this paper. The hypothetical firm's contribu­
tion margin, rather than profit margin, would have been a more effective 
basis for calculating probabilities. For example, a sale that can 
be logged and milled more rapidly may produce more total profit even 
though it has a lower profit margin. Such an analysis would have 
required many more assumptions about the firm. The relationship of 
prices, variable costs, fixed costs and volume of production vary 
24  
with species mix, diameter class, operating characteristics of the 
sale and characteristics of the firm. Variable costs may vary drama­
tically with species mix and bid prices. 
It should be noted that as Firm X operates below its normal 
capacity, the profit margin declines rapidly because fixed costs are 
not being spread over as much volume. Excess inventory would produce 
a similar decline in profit margins if excess long-term volume were 
purchased and not resold. This indicates that optimum expected volume 
is nearly equivalent to optimum expected profit and is the primary 
determinant of the profit margin level that should be selected for 
the long-term analysis. Therefore, optimum profit margins (probab­
ilistic approach) and optimum predicted bid-to-net value ratios 
(regression approach) were based on expected volume equal to the long-
term volume capacity objective (82,000 MBF from sales >= 500 MBF over 
the 10-year period for Firm X). 
Results 
The effectiveness of probabilistic bidding is shown by comparing 
sales that would have been awarded to Firm X with those actually awarded 
to various firms over the 10-year period. Table 5 shows average sale 
characteristics of sales Firm X would have been awarded with the Prob­
abilistic Approach, using the 20.65 percent profit margin required 
to obtain at least 82,000 MBF, compared to actual sales awarded to 
specific firms. The sales are those in Appendix B.l and Appendix 
B.2 with greater than 20.65 percent profit margin. Use of the approach 
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would have resulted in award to Firm X of sales having an average 
mix of sale characteristics. 
Table 5 
AVERAGE AWARDED SALE CHARACTERISTICS 
F irm DBH 7. SKLN VOL/AC 7. W/P PINE % D FIR/L TOTAL-VOL 
X 13.7 40.6 11.7 14.7 49.3 84,948 
1 14.1 37.8 11.2 8.6 51.8 50,098 
2 13.3 74. 1 11.5 16.0 45.1 35,136 
3 14.8 52.4 6.9 22.8 58.9 27,757 
4 13.5 78.0 20.3 4.8 61.8 9,852 
5 13.2 35.0 13.0 14.6 45.0 51,353 
6 11.3 26.9 10.6 5.7 35.4 37,382 
7 14.9 43.4 6.1 38.2 50.1 29,389 
8 16.5 63.0 10.7 22.2 47.6 67,524 
9 13.1 22. 1 9.3 5.2 54.1 31,378 
10 13.5 94.2 15.0 11.8 49.3 53,182 
Others 12.9 31.5 9.5 21.7 33.6 121,180 
Table 6 shows the average prices pai d and profit margins based on 
Firm X's cost structure. 
Table 6 
AVERAGE AWARDED SALE STUMPAGE COST & PROFIT MARGIN 
Firm X's Profit 
Purchaser Stumpage Profit Margin Objective 
F irm Credit Cost/MBF Marg i n @ Firm's Vo1ume 
X $ 30.73 $ 47.63 20.7 % 20.7 % 
1 40.09 127.40 - 6.1 24.2 
2 30.03 71.80 3.7 25.0 
3 34.76 109.98 2.7 29.8 
4 99.83 17.73 21.8 38.1 
5 28.52 69.05 13.7 24.2 
6 32.50 74.18 5.1 25.0 
7 44.13 111.04 10.1 27.1 
8 22.15 93.70 9.4 23.7 
9 26.52 37.84 21.1 25.7 
10 27.40 70.31 - 1.7 24.2 
Others 33.16 83.99 10.9 17.7 
The approach Is clearly superior In profit margin to all actual 
firms, except firms 4 and 9, while obtaining a significantly larger 
volume. Firms 4 and 9 obtained a large portion of their volume through 
SBA set-aside sales. The set-aside sales benefited Firm X, but to 
a much smaller degree. It should be noted that 55 percent of SBA 
sales had one or less bidders and 73 percent had two or less. Non-SBA 
sales had 21 percent and 40 percent, respectively. 
Probabilistic bidding which includes the oral auction bidding 
method requires that an additional assumption be made. This assumption 
Is that the competitive bidding has pushed the bid of the high bidder 
to his estimate of the value, given his cost structure. Appendices 
B.l and B.2 show that, to obtain the volume objective of 41,000 MBF 
for each subpopulation, a 20.7 percent profit margin is required for 
the 54-sale subpopulation while a profit margin of 19.8 percent is 
required for the 60-sale subpopulation. Because of the inconsistency 
between subpopulations and because the oral auction assumption is 
not totally valid, actual probabilistic bidding practice should include 
a safety margin to be certain enough volume is acquired. Statistical 
methods for arriving at a safety margin are not applicable because 
there are insufficient subpopulations to calculate a standard deviation 
for required profit margins and the number of oral auction bids that 
may be lost are unknown. The author suggests a reduction of 10 percent 
of the optimal profit margin may be required (i.e., from 20.7 to 18.6). 
As a firm uses probabilistic bidding, data will be continually updated 
and the optimal profit margin adjusted as sales are lost due to these 
unknowns; thereby improving the accuracy. 
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Probabi1istic and Regression Approach comparisons were based 
on three criteria: 1) average profit margin, 2) consistency between 
subpopulations, and 3) flow of timber to the firm. The Regression 
Approach had a lower average profit margin, with significantly less 
consistency between subpopulations (Table 7). 
Table 7 
COMPARISON OF PROBABILISTIC & REGRESSION APPROACHES 
Probab i1i st i c Regression 
Average Profit Margin: 
Base subpopulation (54 sales) 20.7 % 18.2 % 
Predicted subpopulation (60 sales) 20.7 19.6 
Volume Awarded From Predicted Sales: 
Objecti ve 
Awarded 
40,057 MBF 39,575 MBF 
38,538 30,785 
The flow of timber was only slightly more even with the Regression 
Approach (Graph 8). 
MMBF 
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Two conclusions can be drawn from this chapter: 1) simple prob­
abilistic bidding models based on long-term average profit margins 
and expected long-term volume objectives can substantially reduce 
stumpage costs, and 2) probabi1istic mode 1s are superior to regression 
mode 1s for obta i n i ng 1ower cost stumpage. A1 though probab i1i st i c 
models may appear to result in flow problems, these may be easily 
corrected. First, because most of the sales that would have been 
awarded to Firm X in 1975 had terms of five to six years, only minor 
flow problems would have occurred, and then only in 1979. Second, 
a narrow range of profit margin objectives could be established, in­
creasing the allowable margin during recession (low stumpage price) 
years and decreasing the allowable margin at other times to obtain 
a slightly more even flow. Another alternative would be to make short-
term perchases of logs during occasional shortages of contract timber. 
CHAPTER THREE 
SKEWED BIDDING 
Chapter Three introduces the components of skewed bidding models 
and explains how each component affects the skewness of the bid. 
A linear programming model is developed to determine the optimal dis­
tribution of the total bid among the bid species. The effects of 
assumptions made by the bidder are discussed. The expected payments 
of optimal skewed bidding are compared to actual payments made for 
the 60 closed sales. 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, placing a high proportion of the 
total bid on a particular species is known as skewed bidding. The 
amount that should be placed on each species is dependent on three 
factors: 
1) Bidding rules 
2) Expected difference between cruise and scale volume 
3) Escalation clauses 
Bidding rules determine whether bids other than the advertised 
rate for each species are allowed. If no other bid amount is allowed, 
the bid can not be skewed toward that species. The bidding rules 
are at the discretion of the Forest Service. The primary reason for 
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allowing a bid only at the advertised rate is to prevent skewed bidding. 
The primary species so restricted are those with a very small percentage 
of the total volume or those with high potential for defect or dead 
material. The true firs, lodgepole pine and spruce are most often 
restricted and unsound and dead wood is nearly always restricted. 
Even in unrestricted species the minimum bid allowed is the advertised 
rate. Another method used to reduce skewed bidding is to group the 
species into a few bid groups. Recently the majority of Lolo N. F. 
sales have been grouped into one bid group. However, the following 
analysis is concerned with 60 closed sales sold between 1974 and 1982, 
most of which had more than one bid group. 
The expected difference between the cruise (bid) volume and the 
scale (paid) volume is the primary determinant of which species to 
skew the bid toward. Maximizing the difference between the bid price 
and payment, considering only the volume-difference factor, occurs 
by placing the greatest proportion of the total bid on the species 
with the highest expected percentage decrease in volume from cruise 
to scale. This can be determined by calculating the percentage of 
total volume of each species for both the cruise and expected scale 
volumes and then calculating the percentage change from cruise to 
scale. The cruise is a sample of the sale population and has a percent 
standard error of the sample calculated. This expected error range 
(normally less than + 10 percent) is for the total volume and depends 
on the relative size of the sample and the variability of the stand 
of timber. However, the standard error for each species sampled is 
much greater than that for the whole sale. The smaller the relative 
3 1  
volume of the species, the smaller the sample of that species, the 
greater the potential error. 
The effective use of skewed bidding requires a knowledge superior 
to the Forest Service cruise as to the actual volumes involved. This 
suggests that the bidder must both make a superior cruise prior to 
bidding and monitor the scaling at the time of harvest since the volume 
difference depends on both cruise and scale accuracy. This also 
suggests that control of the volumes of each species harvested must 
be maintained. Such control procedures would include careful bucking 
practices and not allowing sale adjustments unless the percentage 
of the species with the skewed bid is reduced. 
Escalation clauses, used by intermountain area Regions of the 
Forest Service, provide a formula for adjusting stumpage bid (payment) 
rates to reflect lumber market fluctuations. The species allowed 
to escalate are at the discretion of the Forest Service. Again, the 
true firs, lodgepole pine and spruce are more likely to be bid at 
"flat" (nonescalating) rates and unsound and dead wood always at flat 
rates. The escalation procedure is based on the Western Wood Products 
Association's (WWPA) quarterly price indices for each species group. 
When the current calendar quarter index average is lower than the 
base index (quarterly index at the time of sale appraisal), the bid 
rate is adjusted downward by the full amount (100 percent) of such 
difference, but not below the base rate (minimum established payment 
rate). When the quarterly Index Is above the base Index, the bid 
rate is adjusted upward by one-half (50 percent) of the difference, 
but limited to an amount no greater than the amount by which downward 
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escalation could be effective (i.e., <= bid minus base rate) (USDA 
Forest Service, 1977). 
Escalation clauses affect skewed bidding differently depending 
on whether the market fluctuation from sale appraisal to harvest is 
expected to be downward or upward. An expected downward escalation 
suggests that the bid on escalating species be enough higher than 
base rates to allow the full downward escalation. Because the escala­
tion generally occurs on a much larger proportion of the sale volume 
(i.e., more species) than does the cruise-to-scale volume change of 
a particular species, it is normally more profitable to allow for 
such expected escalation changes. However, this depends on the rel­
ative degree of the escalation and volume changes expected. An upward 
escalation suggests that the bid on certain escalating species be 
made at base rates (when advertised rates equal base rates) to prevent 
any escalation from occurring. Escalation is prevented because the 
maximum escalation cannot be greater than the difference between the 
bid and the base rate. The species so selected, and the effectiveness, 
depends on the volume of the species and the difference between 
advertised rates and base rates. The greater the volume and the smaller 
the difference between advertised and base rates, the more effective. 
Again, the relative advantage is dependent on the relative degree 
of the expected escalation and volume changes. 
Because the objective of skewed bidding is to maximize the differ­
ence between the amount bid and the amount paid (when payment i s  l e s s  
than the bid) and because of the many constraints discussed, linear 
programming can be an effective tool for solving the optimal bid 
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distribution. However, as a generalization, the skewness of a bid 
will be more pronounced under the following conditions: 
1) The species dec 1ining in re 1 ative vo1ume makes up a sma11 
proportion of total volume 
2) The expected decline in relative volume is very large, thereby 
reducing the risk of sample error 
3) Species prone to disease or insect damage, such as lodgepole 
or white pine, are involved 
4) The lumber market (quarterly index) is expected to rise, rather 
than fal1 
5) Advertised rates are low, near base rates 
6) Bids are high and competition intense 
Method 
The 60 closed sales described in Chapter Two were selected for 
analysis. Because escalation effects are partially dependent on infla­
tion, actual dollar values were used rather than constant 1980 dollars. 
The following data for each bid species group for each sale was run 
through a linear programming model: 
1) Bid (cruise) volume 
2) Payment (scale) volume 
3) Projected quarterly index 
4) Base index 
5) Base rate 
6) Advertised rate 
7) Actual total high bid for the sale 
All data, except projected quarterly Indices, were obtained from 
sale records. The projected quarterly indices are required to estimate 
the escalation that may occur. The projection is for the term of 
the contract, which may range from 0.5 to 6.75 years. Exponential 
smoothing, regression and even sophisticated econometric models are 
not very accurate for forecasts extended that far into the future. 
The lumber market, however, is seasonal and very cyclical. The market 
cycle occurs with peaks rather regularly at approximately five-year 
intervals. The lumber and wood products price index, after adjustment 
for inflation (using the GNP deflator), shows peaks occurring in 1955, 
1959, (1964), 1969, 1973, 1979 and (1983). Parentheses indicate years 
with very minor peaks (Council of Economic Advisers, 1985). Cycle 
troughs are somewhat less predictable. Quarterly seasonal indices 
were calculated for the 1974 to 1983 period (based on WWPA indices 
in constant 1980 dollars). The deseasonalIzed WWPA quarterly indices 
were then used to calculate quarterly cyclical indices based on a 
five-year cycle (Appendix D). The cyclical index was multiplied by 
the seasonal index to obtain a combined index for each quarter for 
each sale. For the analysis it was assumed the bidder knew where 
in the cycle the sale was made. Professional judgment should allow 
for relatively accurate prediction of where in the cycle the market 
is. Even if the timing is missed a quarter or two, the cyclical index 
sequence can easily be adjusted at the next quarter for the next sales. 
Inflation is another factor that can not be accurately predicted very 
far into the future. For this analysis a long-term average inflation 
rate of five percent was used. For shorter-term contracts professional 
judgment may be used to increase or decrease the assumption to reflect 
current expectations. 
To summarize, the projected quarterly indices for each species 
group was determined by: 
1) Calculating a seasonal index (quarterly basis) 
2) Calculating a five-year cyclical index (quarterly basis) of 
deseasonalized data 
3) Calculating a combined index, by multiplying the two above 
4) Averaging the combined indices for the term of the contract 
5) Obtaining an index multiplier by dividing the contract-average 
index by the combined index on the sale date (represents the 
percentage change from current to the average expected index) 
6) Multiplying the multiplier times the current WWPA quarterly 
i ndex 
7) Including a five percent inflation factor by the annuity 
formu1 a: 
(Index/ct) x (((l+r)c^-l)/r) 
where: ct = contract term (years) 
r = annual inflation rate 
(This assumes that the sale is harvested evenly throughout 
the contract term) 
The linear program model for downward escalation is as follows: 
Maximize: S = Yx« + Zx? - yx, - zxi 
Subject to: 
Total bid: Yx-| + ZX2 = TB 
Escalation: x-j - x-j <= E-j 
xh 
<= E' 
Base rate: x^ >= BR-j 
XJj >= BR2 
Advertised rate: x-j >= AR-j 
X2 >= AR2 
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Where: x^; X2 = $ bid/MBF (species 1; species 2) 
x3* xii = ^ paid/MBF (species 1; species 2) 
Y ; Z = Bid volume (species 1; species 2) 
y ; z = Scale volume (species 1; species 2) 
TB = Total bid price 
E-j; E2 = Base index - projected index (absolute value) 
(species 1; species 2) 
BR-j; BR2 = Base rate (species 1; species 2) 
AR.j ; AR2 = Advertised rate (species 1; species 2) 
The general linear program model for upward escalation is: 
Maximize: S = Yx-j + ZX2 - yx^ - z>^ 
Subject to: 
Total bid: Yx-j + Zx2 = TB 
Escalation: -2x-j + 2xo >= E^ 
-2X2 + 2xu >= E2 
or 
Maximum rate: 2xj - x, <= BRj 
2X2 - x^ < = BR2 
Advertised rate: x-| >= ARj 
X2 >= AR2 
Linear programming is not easily applicable to upward escalations. 
As noted in the model description, either Of two constraints may apply 
(the escalation limit or the maximum rate limit). Different bids 
will change which constraint applies to each species. This requires 
more than one calculation of the model to determine which constraint 
applies. One method is to maximize using >= escalation and maximum 
rate constraints and then determining which variable (constraint) 
is limiting through right-hand-side sensitivity analysis. If the 
limiting variable of decrease for the maximum rate constraint is the 
same as the maximum rate constraint, no change in the inequality sign 
is necessary. If the maximum rate constraint is limited by another 
variable, the escalation and maximum rate constraint signs are changed 
to <=, making the maximum rate the limiting constraint. Occasionally, 
a run of this formulation will miss a constraint that should be changed 
to be limited by the maximum rate. Therefore, if an additional maximum 
rate constraint could be limiting (i.e., the difference between the 
advertised and base rate is less than one-half of the expected escala­
tion), the variable should be constrained by the maximum rate constraint 
to test for a better solution. Because some species are not allowed 
bids other than advertised rates, an equality advertised rate constraint 
must be used for those species. 
After the optimal bid combination was determined, two comparisons 
were made. First, actual payments, expected payments of the successful 
bidder under the escalation assumptions and expected payments of Firm 
X's optimal skewed bid under those assumptions were compared. This 
comparison isolates the difference of expected from actual due to 
escalation assumptions from the difference due to skewed bidding. 
The escalation assumptions were: a cyclical index, five percent infla­
tion and an even cutting pattern during the contract term. Actual 
dollars were used because dates and volumes of actual harvest were 
unknown; therefore, constant dollar calculations for actual payments 
could not be made. Second, probabilistic bidding results based on 
bids as determined in Chapter Two, expected payments of the successful 
bidder under the previous assumptions and expected payments of Firm 
X's optimal skewed bid were compared. This comparison shows the 
potential benefits of probabilistic/skewed bidding combinations. 
Constant 1980 dollars were used in this comparison. 
Assumptions/Skewed Bidding Compart son 
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The average expected payment was $19,140 ($4.61/MBF) less than 
actual payments. This was due primarily to two factors: 1) the average 
inflation rate was much greater during the late 1970s than the assumed 
five percent, and 2) the majority of cutting occurred during the last 
year or two of the contract rather than according to the assumed even 
cutting pattern, incorrect assumptions would have less adverse affect 
on skewed bidding in an upward escalating market than a down market 
because some species would be bid at base rates, resulting in no escal­
ation. An insufficient allowance in a down market would allow payment 
rates to reach base rates before full utilization of the downward 
escalation. 
The average expected payment for Firm X was $37,096 ($8.93/MBF) 
less than the expected payment of the successful bidder. This indicates 
that extensive timber cruises, market projections and skewed bidding 
can have substantial benefits. Because of the underestimation of 
inflation, the actual benefits would have been greater than indicated. 
Since extensive cruises and market analyses are expensive and may 
produce favorable returns on only a small percentage of the sales, 
an analysis of the returns for each sale based on the probabilistic 
bidding method is instructive. 
Probab111stlc/Skewed Bidding Comparison 
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Because of contract escalation clauses and differences between 
cruise and scale volumes, the amount paid for timber will not be the 
same as the amount bid. Basing probabilistic bidding on the amount 
of expected payment, rather than the amount bid, will produce different 
profit margins and sales awarded. That is, the bid would be adjusted 
to reflect the expected payment and the probabilities of paying, rather 
than bidding, a specified amount would be determined. Appendix E 
shows the indicated profit percentage of each sale for probabilistic 
bidding for three bases: 1) bid basis, 2) expected payment basis 
by the successful bidder, and 3) expected payment basis by Firm X 
with optimal skewed bidding. There is a substantial change in profit 
margins for some sales using an expected payment basis rather than 
the bid basis used in Chapter Two. In general, this indicates that 
probabilistic bidding may be more accurate and effective based on 
expected payments rather than bid amounts. However, the sales selected, 
based on expected payments (not skewed), resulted in a change of only 
one sale (#54) from the bid basis and the change in profit margins 
of the selected sales was minimal (Table 8; Bid Basis and Expected 
Payment Basis). If many more sales were required to reach capacity, 
a difference would have been apparent (Appendix E). Using skewed 
bidding expected payments, two additional sales (#11 and #60) become 
highly profitable (Table 8; Skewed Bid Expected Payments Basis). 
Table 8 
BID, EXPECTED PAYMENT, SKEWED BID BASES COMPARISON 
Bid Price Basis 
Skewed 
Sal e Bid Date Prof i t Expected Expected 
No. Yr.Otr Percent Savinqs/MBF Vo1ume 
10 75.2 21.7 $ .00 40,108 
7 75.1 24.2 15.31 38,635 
9 75.2 24.3 17.50 22,728 
19 76.2 30.7 .78 15,013 
57 80.2 31.6 .00 9,404 
8 75.1 41.7 2.11 6,156 
Expected Payment Basis 
Skewed 
Sal e Bid Date Prof i t Expected Expected 
No. Yr.Otr Percent Savi nqs/MBF Volume 
9 75.2 18.3 $ 17.50 43,398 
10 75.2 22.2 .00 35,683 
54 79.3 24.5 .00 18,303 
7 75.1 24.5 15.31 34,210 
57 80.2 31.0 .00 15,013 
19 76.2 32.5 .78 11,765 
8 75.1 42.5 2.11 6,156 
Skewed Bid Expected Payment Basis 
Skewed 
Sal e Bid Date Prof i t Expected Expected 
No. Yr.Otr Percent Savinqs/MBF Vo1ume 
54 79.3 24.5 
O
 
o
 40,139 
60 82.4 24.9 72.51 36,849 
11 75.2 26.6 69.20 36,306 
7 75.1 28.9 15.31 30,920 
57 80.2 31.0 .00 15,013 
19 76.2 32.7 .78 11,765 
8 75.1 43.2 2. 11 6,156 
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Table 8 shows the dates sold, profit margins, expected volumes 
and skewed bidding savings per MBF. Note that the 24.5 percent profit 
margin for the skewed bid expected payments basis is a significant 
increase over the 21.7 percent of the bid basis. The bid date of 
selected sales is a very important indicator of what sales to expend 
funds on for extensive cruises. All sales selected, and most near 
the selection profit margin, were sold during low market periods. 
The savings per MBF for skewed bidding (Appendix E) does not 
reflect the total benefit of skewed bidding. All zero-savings sales 
were due to three causes: 1) single species bid (or all but one species 
allowed to be bid at advertised rates only), 2) sale was bid at 
advertised rates, or 3) the successful bidder skewed the bid the most 
profitable way. Nearly one-half of the zero-savings sales were bid 
at, or within a few cents of, advertised rates. The greater the bid 
premium over advertised rates the more skewed bidding would save. 
Tables 9 and 10 show what Firm X would have bid and paid per 
MBF at the 24.45 percent profit margin required to obtain the capacity 
volume. 
Table 9 
OPTIMAL SKEWED BID FOR SELECTED SALES 
Sal e 
No. 
White P. D.-Fir 
Ponderosa Cedar 
Lodgepole 
Larch Spruce Firs 
54 
60 
11 
7 
57 
19 
8 
$ 89.14 $ 28.47 $ 27.65 
14.35 14.35 
4.25 2.83 
7.40 5.96 
14.16 13.15 
24.38 4.23 
8.04 6.61 
$ 10,567.50 $ 10.10 
251.49 
267.41 
2.83 
5.96 
305.32 1.42 
5.96 586.62 
129.55 12.14 
4.23 2.89 
6.61 5.17 
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Table 10 
EXPECTED PAYMENT FOR OPTIMAL SKEWED BID 
Sal e 
No. 
White P. 
Ponderosa 
D.-Fir 
Cedar 
Lodgepole 
Larch Spruce Firs 
54 
60 
11 
7 
57 
19 
8 
$ 3.26 
14.35 
4.25 
7.40 
14. 16 
43. 19 
8.04 
$ 2.99 
14.35 
2.83 
5.96 
13.15 
4.23 
6 . 6 1  
$ 2.17 
274.15 
281.74 
2.83 
5.96 
$ 10,567.50 $ 10.10 
350.68 1.42 
5.96 595.95 
138.94 12.14 
4.23 2.89 
6.61 5.17 
Sale 54 benefited from an expected large drop in the market, 
therefore, skewing the bid would not be beneficial. The remainder 
of the sales were sold during a relatively low market and had large 
scale-to-cruise volume deviations. The benefit from skewing the bid 
came from both the volume change and the ability to prevent an upward 
escalation on the other species by bidding at base rates. Sale 60 
is noteworthy because the extreme skewed bid is due to a change in 
lodgepole pine volume from 5 MBF to 3 MBF. The small proportion of 
the sale volume and the large percentage reduction is reflected in 
the large bid. 
Throughout the paper road costs have been assumed to be con­
sistently at 79 percent of purchaser credits, with the other 21 percent 
an excess allowance for profit on the road construction. Road costs 
relative to purchaser credit allowances will vary significantly, but 
no data could be obtained for the actual road construction costs. 
Purchaser Credit 
The variation between actual road construction costs and purchaser 
credit should be considered in net value calculations for probabilistic 
biddi ng. 
It has also been assumed that all purchaser credit could either 
be utilized on the sale or transferred to, and utilized on, another 
sale. This will generally be true when purchasing rather large quant­
ities of timber on one Forest. However, since purchaser credit is 
only transferable within the Forest it is earned on and the Forest 
Service can limit the amount transferred into any one sale, excess 
purchaser credits may need to be considered. Excess purchaser credit 
is defined as road credits which cannot be used by the firm. Purchaser 
credit cannot be used below base rates, and often not below base rates 
plus a specified amount of reforestation (K.V.) costs. Successful 
bidding on some sale combinations with high reforestation costs could 
result in excess purchaser credits and additional costs to the 
purchaser. The sales selected by probabilistic bidding appeared not 
to present an excess purchaser credit problem. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS 
Probabilistic Bidding; 
* Probabilistic bidding can significantly lower stumpage costs and 
increase profit. 
* Probabilistic bidding is superior in consistency and profitability 
to regression prediction of bids. 
* Expected payments, rather than bids, may be a more accurate basis 
for probabilistic bidding if reasonably accurate predictions of 
market cycles and inflation rates can be made. 
* Probabilistic bidding will tend to result in successful bids being 
concentrated during recession years. 
* The flow of timber will produce large inventories of standing stock 
at the beginning of a market cycle and low inventories at the market 
peak. If inventory becomes insufficient at the market peaks, short-
term log purchases can be made where material costs and product 
prices can be more closely matched. If an excess timber supply 
is purchased and the contracts will come due prior to manufacture, 
the logs can be sold profitably to other mills while the market 
cycle is relatively high, or the timber can be traded for similar 
timber for later delivery. 
Skewed B i dd i ng: 
* Skewed bidding may reduce payments substantially, provided extensive 
cruise and market analyses are made prior to bidding and control 
procedures are used during harvest. 
* Linear programming can be an effective tool for determining the 
optimal species' bids, but judgment and trial must be used to select 
upward escalation constraints. 
* Cruise and market analyses and skewed bidding can be most profitably 
used with probabilistic bidding and concentrated during recession 
years. The larger expenditures for timber procurement should be 
made when other firms are reducing expenditures. 
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Purchaser Credit: 
* If excess purchaser credit (after potential transfers) may occur, 
an additional cost must be added to the sale to compensate for 
the excess. 
* A second method, available to small firms, for preventing excess 
credit is to have the Forest Service construct the road and forgo 
the credits. This method is especially effictive when purchasing 
large amounts of timber during recession years because it lowers 
the risk by reducing cash investment prior to actual harvest. 
Sal e 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
APPENDIX A 
SALE CHARACTERISTICS 
Vo1ume Sale Bid Contrac 
Ave DBH Slope % Per Haul Vo1ume Date Term 
Vol Wtd 7, Skv1i ne Acre Mi 1 es (MBF) Yr.Otr (Yrs) 
12.5 30 12 9.1 11 6,360 74.2 4.75 
17.2 30 0 7.5 25 4,070 74.2 3.75 
15.8 60 69 7.1 17 6,105 74.2 4.75 
18.5 20 0 * 7.7 13 2,840 74.3 2.50 
20.2 50 66 # 8.1 26 1,418 74.2 3.25 
17.5 * 15 0 9.0 15 1,080 74.4 2.25 
15.3 50 66 * 17.7 37 17,150 75.1 6.00 
12.5 35 0 8.8 30 5,250 75.1 5.00 
12.3 35 26 3.3 41 7,913 75.2 5.75 
8.0 20 * 0 * 5.0 * 35 1,875 75.2 .50 
11.9 35 0 10.5 40 6,400 75.2 5.25 
12.1 31 23 * 13.5 43 19,890 75.3 5.75 
13.0 * 15 0 3.1 4 1,221 75.4 2.00 
19.5 45 85 7.3 34 4,010 75.4 3.25 
15.4 50 66 * 10.6 31 7,599 76.2 5.25 
13.9 50 73 8.3 47 7,520 76.2 4.75 
19.5 40 43 9.0 32 2,723 76.2 2.75 
15.7 50 66 6.9 31 12,092 76.2 6.75 
14.6 35 32 * 2.8 32 3,230 76.2 3.25 
16.6 50 74 9.5 31 3,600 76.2 3.75 
17.1 40 44 * 14.2 32 2,473 76.2 3.25 
13.8 45 32 3.1 30 665 76.4 1.00 
16.5 50 64 6.5 35 5,757 77.1 3.75 
12.7 35 49 10.0 46 3,600 77.1 4.00 
12.0 45 88 12.8 31 14,900 77.1 5.50 
15.8 25 10 * 5.0 34 3,950 77.2 2.75 
19.6 65 100 ft 12.3 29 4,499 77.3 3.50 
9.0 20 0 9.1 35 2,270 77.3 1.25 
14.1 50 66 ft 11.4 44 4,550 77.3 3.50 
9.0 10 0 ft 10.2 35 6,730 77.3 2.25 
15.8 30 21 ft 3.2 32 1,993 77.3 1.75 
14.9 50 75 5.0 34 2,580 77.3 3.50 
13.2 40 55 5.4 38 6,080 77.3 4.50 
14.1 35 33 8.7 41 2,442 77.3 3.00 
15.3 35 0 7.5 19 3,120 77.3 6.50 
15.3 43 50 ft 8.4 24 9,440 77.4 5.25 
11.6 45 55 ft 4.5 34 5,220 78.1 6.50 
13.4 47 59 ft 2.5 22 1,270 78.1 2.50 
10.0 * 30 0 5.6 22 1,247 78.2 2.50 
19.2 45 76 10.2 36 3,745 78.2 3.50 
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41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
6 1  
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
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SALE CHARACTERISTICS 
Vo1ume Sal e Bid Contrac 
Ave DBH Slope % Per Haul Vo1ume Date Term 
Vol Wtd 7. Skvli ne Acre Mi 1 es (MBF) Yr.Otr (Yrs) 
10.0 # 30 21 * 9.0 24 643 78.2 1.50 
13.3 30 21 * 8.0 23 2,420 78.3 3.50 
16.3 50 66 * 4.2 12 2,220 78.3 4.50 
11.5 * 0 0 5.0 53 1,928 78.3 2.50 
13.6 40 44 * 6.0 43 2,068 78.3 3.50 
16.0 * 35 42 6.0 26 1,687 78.3 3.25 
10.0 * 25 0 6.0 38 1,166 78.3 2.50 
13.9 50 67 8.0 14 6,290 78.3 5.50 
13.5 * 40 44 # 6.0 23 954 78.3 1.50 
13.5 * 45 55 * 5.0 23 779 78.4 3.00 
15.5 * 25 10 * 6.7 31 2,130 79.1 2.50 
13.6 40 44 * 5.4 31 3,480 79.2 4.50 
10.0 * 35 32 * 6.2 35 4,170 79.2 4.75 
20.5 55 200 3.1 10 3,390 79.3 1.75 
11.4 37 37 * 7.4 34 3,010 79.3 3.00 
13.5 * 50 66 * 10.0 12 2,310 79.3 2.50 
12.3 15 0 * 8.0 5 3,120 80.2 3.75 
13.5 40 57 10.5 21 2,988 80.4 2.75 
17.5 * 55 77 * 7.6 15 2,080 81.2 2.50 
17.0 50 75 10.0 26 570 82.4 1.75 
12.7 25 24 14.2 26 19,320 78.2 2.84 
13.4 40 41 3.6 34 5,630 78.3 1.85 
12.0 49 96 7.5 16 1,988 79.1 4.79 
19.1 65 200 5.7 5 7,940 79.1 4.82 
13.9 45 57 11.2 18 9,100 79.2 4.85 
18.0 40 57 15.0 15 4,520 79.2 1.85 
12.1 10 0 8.0 5 4,150 79.3 4.84 
17.2 25 0 13.8 43 5,750 79.3 3.84 
17.4 55 74 4.5 49 5,270 79.3 4.83 
18.0 48 78 6.0 24 4,870 79.3 4.84 
13.0 45 59 18.0 23 8,130 79.3 1.86 
12.0 35 10 9.3 35 5,610 79.3 1.84 
12.0 30 6 7.5 37 4,500 79.4 1.84 
20.8 45 200 3.6 25 4,210 80.3 4.82 
10.5 30 0 8.0 54 1,664 80.3 1.83 
13.3 55 88 28.0 32 5,732 80.3 3.84 
17.8 15 10 7.0 9 2,830 80.4 1.84 
15.0 30 0 14.5 36 9,600 80.4 1.86 
15.2 45 50 11.0 24 4,800 80.4 4.84 
9.7 40 28 8.0 38 4,467 80.4 1.85 
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SALE CHARACTERISTICS 
Vo1ume Sale Bid Contract 
Sal e Ave DBH Slope % Per Haul Vo1ume Date Term 
No. Vol Wtd % Skyli ne Acre Mi 1 es (MBF) Yr.Qtr (Yrs) 
81 17.7 60 200 13.6 14 12,355 80.4 1.86 
82 12.0 60 88 15.0 41 10,191 81.4 4.85 
83 11.4 28 0 13.0 34 6,337 81.4 1.87 
84 13.8 55 64 9.6 18 4, 120 81.1 3.86 
85 13.0 30 52 9.0 18 5,930 81.1 1.87 
86 13.0 30 10 6.0 2 600 81.2 4.83 
87 12.7 45 45 5. 1 12 2,260 81.2 4.84 
88 9.9 15 5 13.5 39 14,099 81.3 1.86 
89 1 1.4 20 0 12.0 20 4,418 82.4 4.86 
90 13.9 18 28 23.1 25 7,198 82.4 4.86 
91 12.0 20 9 12.0 16 4,650 82.4 4.86 
92 10.0 53 90 9.0 12 670 82.1 4.83 
93 12.4 15 9 13.0 16 4,344 82.2 1.86 
94 11.4 25 0 7.0 36 1,180 82.3 4.84 
95 11.0 20 0 14.0 44 871 81.4 3.83 
96 13.0 39 35 9.4 16 9,110 83.3 4.87 
97 10.9 35 0 17.0 29 1,308 83.4 1.23 
98 11.7 45 100 18.9 41 1,153 83.4 2.00 
99 12.6 55 84 22.0 42 1,940 83.4 1.92 
100 8.8 20 0 18.0 28 1,005 83. 1 1.70 
101 9.2 35 0 20.5 34 756 83.2 1.50 
102 13.1 40 53 20.6 43 7,308 83.2 4.48 
103 15.0 40 50 5.6 41 4,294 83.2 3.67 
104 10. 1 15 5 12.8 39 12,944 83.2 3.80 
105 14.8 50 73 12.0 31 1,110 83.2 2.27 
106 9.8 20 0 1 1 .6 37 3,089 83.2 2.77 
107 14.4 50 36 6.7 42 605 83.2 1.34 
108 16.9 38 0 2.4 28 1,259 83.2 1.48 
109 18. 1 20 0 37.3 28 635 83.3 1.17 
1 10 9. 1 25 17 11.2 37 11,440 83.2 4.77 
1 11 12.0 45 22 18. 1 31 3,858 83.3 2.10 
1 12 9.0 25 0 24.3 47 1,400 83.3 2.10 
1 13 10.2 20 0 3.2 55 604 83.3 1.45 
1 14 12. 1 45 69 13.2 39 4,817 83.3 3.00 
* Estimated data: 
DBH - dbh by species unavailable; estimates from species mix 
and average dbh for the sale. 
SKYLINE - estimates obtained by regression analysis of known 
sales using slope % as the independent variable (200 
percent = helicopter). 
APPENDIX B.l 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACH (54 SALES) 
Sale 
Sal e Volume 
No. (MBF) 
68 5,750 
82 10,191 
71 8,130 
61 19,320 
70 4,870 
92 670 
69 5,270 
77 2,830 
66 4,520 
67 4, 150 
98 1,153 
83 6,337 
62 5,630 
78 9,600 
81 12,355 
72 5,610 
65 9,100 
63 1,988 
99 1,940 
106 3,089 
114 4,817 
88 14,099 
105 1,110 
110 11,440 
102 7,308 
73 4,500 
75 1,664 
85 5,930 
86 600 
107 605 
96 9, 110 
1 13 604 
64 7,940 
104 12,944 
91 4,650 
97 1,308 
1 12 1,400 
87 2,260 
100 1,005 
76 5,732 
80 4,467 
Bid Selling 
Date Value 
Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) 
79. 3 312. 59 
81. 4 305. 68 
79. 3 309. 19 
78. 2 290. 17 
79. 3 345. 20 
82. 1 299. 97 
79. 3 396. 12 
80. 4 328. 31 
79. 2 358. 79 
79. 3 301. 56 
83. 4 306. 29 
81. 4 296.34 
78. 3 340. 22 
80. 4 306. 07 
80. 4 342. 98 
79. 3 303. 84 
79. 2 320. 21 
79. 1 311. 67 
83. 4 318. 56 
83. 2 290. 15 
83. 3 311. 95 
81. 3 286. 68 
83. 2 342. 53 
83. 2 287. 15 
83. 2 298. 37 
79. 4 318. 64 
80. 3 295. 19 
81. 1 294. 27 
81. 2 332. 58 
83. 2 320. 88 
83. 3 337. 96 
83. 3 290. 24 
79. 1 383. 56 
83. 2 290. 10 
82. 4 293. 58 
83. 4 293. 41 
83. 3 287. 09 
81.2 336. 34 
83. I 292. 28 
80. 3 305. 98 
80. 4 292. 04 
Firm X Net 
Cost Value 
($/MBF) ($/MBF) 
163.75 148.84 
254.67 51.01 
218.85 90.34 
186.18 103.99 
214.74 130.46 
292.18 7.79 
219.17 176.95 
168.37 159.94 
195.49 163.30 
188.28 113.28 
279.56 26.73 
180.96 115.38 
211.79 128.43 
167.44 138.63 
304.51 38.47 
187.40 116.44 
217.29 102.92 
281.44 30.23 
260.30 58.26 
201.60 88.55 
240.07 71.88 
198.13 88.55 
241.46 101.07 
214.43 72.72 
216.08 82.29 
194.49 124.15 
210.19 85.00 
224.85 69.42 
198.06 134.52 
222.16 98.72 
204.21 133.75 
226.70 63.54 
296.63 86.93 
200.10 90.00 
197.87 95.71 
203.38 90.03 
205.82 81.27 
222.78 113.56 
214.31 77.97 
229.05 76.93 
225.38 66.66 
Actual Profit 
Bid Margin 
($/MBF) (%) 
221.10 -23.1 
111.77 -19.9 
146.35 -18.1 
153.88 -17.2 
189.55 -17.1 
45.25 -12.5 
208.61 - 8.0 
180.27 - 6.2 
183.54 - 5.6 
123.86 - 3.5 
34.62 - 2.6 
120.03 - 1.6 
129.75 - .4 
138.33 .1 
28.90 2.8 
100.18 5.4 
85.13 5.6 
10.89 6.2 
37.90 6.4 
67.05 7.4 
44.34 8.8 
60.56 9.8 
67.39 9.8 
43.29 10.2 
50.56 10.6 
89.07 11.0 
48.93 12.2 
32.22 12.6 
86.57 14.4 
50.71 15.0 
82.87 15.1 
19.65 15.1 
28.12 15.3 
43.94 15.9 
47.29 16.5 
40.82 16.8 
29.91 17.9 
49.59 19.0 
21.63 19.3 
17.41 19.5 
7.14 20.4 
Expected 
Vo1ume 
(MBF) 
267,939 
262,189 
251,998 
243,868 
224,548 
219,678 
219,008 
213,738 
210,908 
206,388 
202,238 
201,085 
194,748 
189,118 
179,518 
167,163 
161,553 
152,453 
150,465 
148,525 
145,436 
139,509 
140,619 
125,410 
113,970 
106,662 
102,162 
100,498 
94,568 
93,968 
92,759 
93,363 
83,649 
75,709 
62,765 
58,115 
56,807 
55,407 
53,147 
52,142 
46,410 
49 
50 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACH (54 SALES) 
Sal e Bid Se11i ng Firm X Net Actual Profit Expectee 
Sal e Volume Date Value Cost Val ue Bid Margi n Vo1ume 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ($/MBF) (7.) (MBF) 
93 4,344 82.2 299.71 194.62 105.09 43.18 20.7 41,943 
1 11 3,858 83.3 294.57 204.74 89.83 26.45 21.5 37,599 
109 635 83.3 344.12 158.35 185.77 110.50 21.9 33,741 
94 1,180 82.3 280.56 208.20 72.36 7.89 ' 23.0 33,106 
74 4,210 80.3 376.85 284.44 92.41 3.03 23.7 31,926 
101 756 83.2 297.11 211.96 85. 15 14.21 23.9 27,716 
84 4,120 81.1 305.45 210.94 94.51 18.17 25.0 26,960 
103 4,294 83.2 353.29 218.52 134.77 44.05 25.7 22,840 
95 871 81.4 280.30 201.93 78.37 2.52 27.1 18,546 
89 4,418 82.4 294.29 193.10 101.19 13.59 29.8 17,675 
90 7, 198 82.4 287.60 188.34 99.26 13.59 29.8 13,257 
108 1,259 83.2 373.81 184.89 188.92 67.19 32.6 6,059 
79 4,800 80.4 334.28 201.79 132.49 5.26 38.1 4,800 
APPENDIX B.2 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACH (60 SALES) 
Sal e Bid Se11ing Firm X Net Actual Prof i t Expected 
Sale Vo1ume Date Val ue Cost Val ue Bid Marg i n Vo1ume 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ( % )  (MBF) 
59 2,080 81.2 319.63 232.41 87.22 143.35 -17.6 256,280 
49 954 78.3 286.06 228.66 57.40 94.03 -12.8 254,200 
28 2,270 77.3 286.39 214.93 71.46 98.56 - 9.5 253,246 
42 2,420 78.3 294.89 206.17 88.72 116.61 - 9.5 250,976 
46 1,687 78.3 378.22 194.86 183.36 214.55 - 8.2 248,556 
56 2,310 79.3 331.53 235.89 95.64 122.73 - 8.2 246,869 
4 2,840 74.3 319.66 170.57 149.09 173.39 - 7.6 244,559 
21 2,473 76.2 261.58 200.78 60.80 80.62 - 7.6 241,719 
30 6,730 77.3 286.39 197.18 89.21 102.05 - 4.5 239,246 
36 9,440 77.4 348.00 204.21 143.79 156.56 - 3.7 232,516 
51 2, 130 79. 1 350.87 181.25 169.62 181.07 - 3.3 223,076 
44 1,928 78.3 298.03 203.38 94.65 94.16 .2 220,946 
48 6,290 78.3 346.51 226.38 120.13 118.52 .5 219,018 
15 7,599 76.2 332.07 212.24 119.83 117.73 .6 212,728 
12 19,890 75.3 292.81 196.98 95.83 93.06 .9 205,129 
22 665 76.4 312.80 227.28 85.52 81.79 1.2 185,239 
58 2,988 80.4 315.28 212.52 102.76 96.69 1.9 184,574 
25 14,900 77. 1 301.61 247.46 54. 15 47.06 2.4 181,586 
37 5,220 78. 1 298.70 243.94 54.76 47.02 2.6 166,686 
40 3,745 78.2 398.30 203.75 194.55 182.43 3.0 161,466 
34 2,442 77.3 300.60 209.24 91.36 81.56 3.3 157,721 
47 1,166 78.3 301.23 215.10 86.13 75.78 3.4 155,279 
52 3,480 79.2 323.35 223.89 99.46 87.12 3.8 154,113 
31 1,993 77.3 362.79 200.27 162.52 147.91 4.0 150,633 
55 3,010 79.3 300.34 233.07 67.27 53.98 4.4 148,640 
24 3,600 77. 1 348.22 221.99 126.23 105.63 5.9 145,630 
5 1,418 74.2 418.49 198.97 219.52 188.64 7.4 142,030 
16 7,520 76.2 379.72 237.53 142.19 113.88 7.5 140,612 
50 779 78.4 273.78 247.80 25.98 5.25 7.6 133,092 
26 3,950 77.2 322.44 187.05 135.39 109.16 8.1 132,313 
27 4,499 77.3 387.98 213.45 174.53 142.63 8.2 128,363 
45 2,068 78.3 333.61 226.07 107.54 80.05 8.2 123,864 
13 1,221 75.4 304.40 203.21 101.19 74.92 8.6 121,796 
2 4,070 74.2 356.13 159.78 196.35 164.15 9.0 120,575 
17 2,723 76.2 377.75 185.33 192.42 157.59 9.2 116,505 
32 2,580 77.3 343.01 245.85 97.16 64.85 9.4 113,782 
41 643 78.2 311.83 232.56 79.27 47.74 10.1 111,202 
53 4,170 79.2 301.60 234.10 67.50 35.72 10.5 110,559 
6 1,080 74.4 306.58 175.14 131.44 98.43 10.8 106,389 
23 5,757 77. 1 349.72 213.29 136.43 97.20 11.2 105,309 
43 2,220 78.3 371.91 229.90 142.01 100.49 11.2 99,552 
29 4,550 77.3 325.26 224.38 100.88 63.71 11.4 97,332 
1 6,360 74.2 302.27 186.11 116.16 81.44 11.5 92,782 
51 
52 
PROBABILISTIC APPROACH (60 SALES) 
Sale Bid Sel1ing Firm X Net Actual Profit Expected 
Sal e Volume Date Value Cost Value Bid Marg i n Vo1ume 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ($/MBF) ($/MBF) (%) (MBF) 
3 6,105 74.2 385.08 217.26 167.82 1 19.96 12.4 86,422 
11 6,400 75.2 319.21 191.39 127.82 87.87 12.5 80,317 
60 570 82.4 370.37 216.27 154.10 103.92 13.5 73,917 
38 1,270 78.1 335.89 243.75 92. 14 41.19 15.2 73,347 
20 3,600 76.2 400.75 215.91 184.84 122.05 15.7 72,077 
35 3,120 77.3 353.32 169.80 183.52 125.35 16.5 68,477 
33 6,080 77.3 318.13 224.60 93.53 37.07 17.7 65,357 
18 12,092 76.2 370.62 203.88 166.74 100.37 17.9 59,277 
54 3,390 79.3 375.74 297.17 78.57 7.03 19.0 47,185 
14 4,010 75.4 350.60 215.07 135.53 65.96 19.8 43,795 
39 1,247 78.2 329.67 203.64 126.03 59.76 20.1 39,785 
10 1,875 75.2 291.30 223.84 67.46 4.21 21.7 38,538 
7 17,150 75.1 347.06 210.40 136.66 52.52 24.2 36,663 
9 7,913 75.2 315.59 209.49 106.10 29.28 24.3 19,513 
19 3,230 76.2 323.88 215.16 108.72 9.26 30.7 11,600 
57 3,120 80.2 298.62 191.07 107.55 13.10 31.6 8,370 
8 5,250 75. 1 328.47 184.68 143.79 6.97 41.7 5,250 
APPENDIX C.l 
REGRESSION APPROACH (54 SALES) 
Pre-
Sale Bid Net dieted Ac.Bid- Pr.Bid- Expected Profit 
Sale Volume Date Value Bid Pr.Bid Nt.Valu Volume Margin 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) Rat i o Rat i o (MBF) (%) 
98 1,153 83.4 26.73 14.26 2.43 .53 0 .0 
82 10,191 81.4 51.01 55.03 2.03 1.08 0 .0 
105 1,110 83.2 101.07 37.25 1.81 .37 0 .0 
86 600 81.2 134.52 48.26 1.79 .36 0 .0 
85 5,930 81.1 69.42 19.15 1.68 .28 0 .0 
78 9,600 80.4 138.63 84.58 1.64 .61 0 .0 
81 12,355 80.4 38.47 17.67 1.64 .46 0 .0 
92 670 82. 1 7.79 30.96 1.46 3.97 0 .0 
99 1,940 83.4 58.26 25.99 1.46 .45 0 .0 
77 2,830 80.4 159.94 128.65 1.40 .80 0 .0 
67 4,150 79.3 113.28 92.57 1.34 .82 0 .0 
100 1,005 83. 1 77.97 . 17.15 1.26 .22 0 .0 
70 4,870 79.3 130.46 153.81 1.23 1.18 0 .0 
71 8,130 79.3 90.34 119.56 1.22 1.32 0 .0 
68 5,750 79.3 148.84 183.15 1.21 1.23 0 .0 
89 4,418 82.4 101. 19 11.60 1.17 .11 0 .0 
106 3,089 83.2 88.55 57.27 1.17 .65 0 .0 
83 6,337 81.4 115.38 105.13 1.14 .91 0 .0 
97 1,308 83.4 90.03 37.25 1.10 .41 0 .0 
107 605 83.2 98.72 46.82 1.08 .47 0 .0 
61 19,320 78.2 103.99 150.90 1.02 1.45 0 .0 
62 5,630 78.3 128.43 126.61 1.02 .99 0 .0 
69 5,270 79.3 176.95 213.92 .98 1.21 156,948 - 9.3 
66 4,520 79.2 163.30 183.97 1.00 1.13 151,678 - 5.8 
114 4,817 83.3 71.88 72.81 .61 1.01 147,158 - .3 
65 9,100 79.2 102.92 103.06 .83 1.00 142,341 .0 
96 9,110 83.3 133.75 132.13 .63 .99 133,241 .5 
72 5,610 79.3 116.44 112.32 .89 .96 124,131 1.4 
109 635 83.3 185.77 161.95 .68 .87 118,521 6.9 
63 1,988 79.1 30.23 25.18 .43 .83 117,886 1.6 
102 7,308 83.2 82.29 65.53 .77 .80 115,898 5.6 
110 11,440 83.2 72.72 56.50 .77 .78 108,590 5.6 
88 14,099 81.3 88.55 67.22 .90 .76 97,150 7,4 
73 4,500 79.4 124.15 92.85 .96 .75 83,051 9.8 
87 2,260 81.2 113.56 71.86 .69 .63 78,551 12.4 
64 7,940 79. 1 86.93 54.91 .51 . 63 76,291 8.3 
84 4,120 81.1 94.51 58.76 .31 .62 68,351 II.7 
75 1,664 80.3 85.00 51.01 .96 .60 64,231 11.5 
104 12,944 83.2 90.00 53.98 .81 .60 62,567 12.4 
90 7,198 82.4 99.26 59.06 .23 .60 49,623 14.0 
53 
REGRESSION APPROACH (54 SALES) 
Pre-
Sale Bid Net dieted Ac.Bid- Pr.Bid- Expected Profit 
Sale Volume Date Value Bid Pr.Bid Nt.Valu Volume Margin 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) Ratio Rat io (MBF) ( % >  
Ill 3,858 83.3 89.83 52.89 .50 .59 42,425 12.5 
91 4,650 82.4 95.71 50.20 .94 .52 38,567 15.5 
76 5,732 80.3 76.93 39.22 .44 .51 33,917 12.3 
108 1,259 83.2 188.92 94.79 .71 .50 28,185 25.2 
103 4,294 83.2 134.77 65.20 .68 .48 26,926 19.7 
93 4,344 82.2 105.09 49.25 .88 .47 22,632 18.6 
112 1,400 83.3 81.27 37.21 .80 .46 18,288 15.3 
113 604 83.3 63.54 23.85 .82 .38 16,888 13.7 
94 1,180 82.3 72.36 27.23 .29 .38 16,284 16.1 
101 756 83.2 85.15 29.46 .48 .35 15,104 18.7 
79 4,800 80.4 132.49 37.27 .14 .28 14,348 28.5 
95 871 81.4 78.37 18.80 . 13 .24 9,548 21.3 
74 4,210 80.3 92.41 20.80 . 15 .23 8,677 19.0 
80 4,467 80.4 66.66 11.30 .63 .17 4,467 19.0 
APPENDIX C.2 
REGRESSION APPROACH (60 SALES) 
Pre-
Sal e Bid Net di cted Ac.Bid- Pr.Bid- Expected Profit 
Sal e Volume Date Va 1 ue Bid Pr.Bid Nt.Valu Vo1ume Margin 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) Rat i o Rat i o (MBF) ( % )  
59 2,080 81.2 87.22 37.00 3.87 .42 0 .0 
28 2,270 77.3 71.46 51.70 1.91 .72 0 .0 
22 665 76.4 85.52 44.58 1.83 .52 0 .0 
30 6,730 77.3 89.21 59. 18 1.72 .66 0 .0 
49 954 78.3 57.40 56.81 1.66 .99 0 .0 
44 1,928 78.3 94.65 62.09 1.52 .66 0 .0 
56 2,310 79.3 95.64 83.66 1.47 .87 0 .0 
47 1,166 78.3 86.13 52.25 1.45 .61 0 .0 
11 6,400 75.2 127.82 63.41 1.39 .50 0 .0 
19 3,230 76'. 2 108.72 6.75 1.37 .06 0 .0 
60 570 82.4 154.10 82.77 1.26 .54 0 .0 
51 2,130 79.1 169.62 147.14 1.23 .87 0 .0 
12 19,890 75.3 95.83 76.10 1.22 .79 0 .0 
13 1,221 75.4 101.19 64.05 1.17 .63 0 .0 
16 7,520 76.2 142.19 99.62 1.14 .70 0 .0 
42 2,420 78.3 88.72 109.86 1.06 1.24 0 .0 
55 3,010 79.3 67.27 50.89 1.06 .76 0 .0 
3 6,105 74.2 167.82 114.07 1.05 .68 0 .0 
52 3,480 79.2 99.46 82.66 1.05 .83 0 .0 
4 2,840 74.3 149.09 169.29 1.02 1.14 0 .0 
1 6,360 74.2 116.16 80.53 1.01 .69 0 .0 
21 2,473 76.2 60.80 110.93 .73 1.82 173,001 -19.2 
25 14,900 77. 1 54,15 89.01 .53 1.64 170,528 -11.6 
37 5,220 78. 1 54.76 70.07 .67 1.28 155,628 - 5.1 
34 2,442 77.3 91.36 1 15.84 .70 1.27 150,408 - 8.1 
48 6,290 78.3 120.13 149.17 .79 1.24 147,966 - 8.4 
29 4,550 77.3 100.88 123.97 .51 1.23 141,676 - 7.1 
33 6,080 77.3 93.53 111.94 .33 1.20 137,126 - 5.8 
36 9,440 77.4 143.79 171.70 .91 1.19 131,046 - 8.0 
27 4,499 77.3 174.53 207.32 .69 1.19 121,606 - 8.5 
46 1,687 78.3 183.36 213.69 1.00 1.17 117,107 - 8.0 
5 1,418 74.2 219.52 240.91 .78 1.10 115,420 - 5.1 
23 5,757 77. 1 136.43 147.84 . 66 1.08 114,002 - 3.3 
15 7,599 76.2 119.83 123.97 .95 1.03 108,245 - 1.2 
35 3,120 77.3 183.52 187.91 .67 1.02 100,646 - 1.2 
40 3,745 78.2 194.55 192.46 .95 .99 97,526 .5 
24 3,600 77. 1 126.23 125.42 .84 .99 93,781 .2 
26 3,950 77.2 135.39 132.88 .82 .98 90,181 .8 
2 4,070 74.2 196.35 190.66 .86 .97 86,231 1.6 
18 12,092 76.2 166.74 159.81 .63 .96 82,161 1.9 
58 2,988 80.4 102.76 97.75 .99 .95 70,069 1.6 
17 2,723 76.2 192.42 179.02 .88 .93 67,081 3.5 
55 
REGRESSION APPROACH (60 SALES) 
Pre-
Sal e Bid Net di cted Ac.B i d- Pr.Bid- Expected Profit 
Sal e Volume Date Value Bid Pr.Bid Nt.Valu Vo1ume Margin 
No. (MBF) Yr.Qtr ($/MBF) ($/MBF) Rat i o Ratio (MBF) ( % )  
31 1,993 77.3 162.52 149.05 .99 .92 64,358 3.7 
50 779 78.4 25.98 23.79 .22 .92 62,365 .8 
20 3,600 76.2 184.84 168.15 .73 .91 61,586 4.2 
39 1,247 78.2 126.03 107.95 .55 .86 57,986 5.5 
41 643 78.2 79.27 66.06 .72 .83 56,739 4.2 
32 2,580 77.3 97.16 77.87 .83 .80 56,096 5.6 
6 1,080 74.4 131.44 101.31 .97 .77 53,516 9.8 
45 2,068 78.3 107.54 80.04 1.00 .74 52,436 8.2 
43 2,220 78.3 142.01 100.49 1.00 .71 50,368 11.2 
53 4, 170 79.2 67.50 47.84 .75 .71 48,148 6.5 
9 7,913 75.2 106.10 73.77 .40 .70 43,978 10.2 
14 4,010 75.4 135.53 89.16 .74 .66 36,065 13.2 
38 1,270 78.1 92.14 57.20 .72 .62 32,055 10.4 
57 3,120 80.2 107.55 59.68 .22 .55 30,785 16.0 
8 5,250 75.1 143.79 69.59 . 10 .48 27,665 22.6 
7 17,150 75.1 136.66 62.23 .84 .46 22,415 21.4 
10 1,875 75.2 67.46 28.16 . 15 .42 5,265 13.5 
54 3,390 79.3 78.57 30.05 .23 .38 3,390 12.9 
APPENDIX D 
SEASONAL/CYCLICAL INDICES 
Seasonal Cyclical Combined 
Year.Qtr Index Index Index 
1974.1 .998 1.077 1.075 
1974.2 1.016 1.088 1.105 
1974.3 1.019 1.088 1.109 
1974.4 .967 1.076 1.04 
1975.1 .998 .956 .954 
1975.2 1.016 .812 .825 
1975.3 1.019 .905 .922 
1975.4 .967 .976 .944 
1976.1 .998 .931 .929 
1976.2 1.016 .923 .938 
1976.3 1.019 .921 .938 
1976.4 .967 .978 .946 
1977.1 .998 .99 .988 
1977.2 1.016 .954 .969 
1977.3 1.019 1.003 1.022 
1977.4 .967 1.033 .999 
1978.1 .998 1.063 1.061 
1978.2 1.016 1.066 1.083 
1978.3 1.019 1.048 1.068 
1978.4 .967 1.113 1.076 
1979.1 .998 1.077 1.075 
1979.2 1.016 1.088 1.105 
1979.3 1.019 1.088 1.109 
1979.4 .967 1.076 1.04 
1980.1 .998 .956 .954 
1980.2 1.016 .812 .825 
1980.3 1.019 .905 .922 
1980.4 .967 .976 .944 
1981.1 .998 .931 .929 
1981.2 1.016 .923 .938 
1981.3 1.019 .921 .938 
1981.4 .967 .978 .946 
1982.1 .998 .99 .988 
1982.2 1.016 .954 .969 
1982.3 1.019 1.003 1.022 
1982.4 .967 1.033 .999 
1983.1 .998 1.063 1.061 
1983.2 1.016 1.066 1.083 
1983.3 1.019 1.048 1.068 
1983.4 .967 1.113 1.076 
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APPENDIX E 
PROBABILISTIC/SKEWED BIDDING COMPARISON 
Expected Skewed Bid Skewed Bid 
Bid Payment Exp. Payment Expected 
Basi s Basi s Basi s Sav i ngs 
(Profit 1.) (Profit t) (Profit %) ($/MBF) 
11.5 12.9 14.1 $ 3.69 
9.0 11.9 12.1 .85 
12.4 13.6 14.0 1.46 
- 7.6 9.6 14.1 14.78 
7.4 12.3 18.0 23.69 
10.8 17.9 17.9 .00 
24.2 24.5 28.9 15.31 
41.7 42.5 43.2 2.11 
24.3 18.3 23.8 17.50 
21.7 22.2 22.2 .00 
12.5 5.9 26.6 69.20 
.9 9.4 21.9 35.94 
8.6 9.5 11.8 7.08 
19.8 14.1 16.4 7.97 
.6 - 1.8 3.0 15.85 
7.5 3.6 4.0 1.36 
9.2 6.1 11.1 19.23 
17.9 12.6 12.6 .00 
30.7 32.5 32.7 .78 
15.7 11.9 13.2 5.43 
- 7.6 -11.2 -11.0 .57 
1.2 - 3.1 - 3.1 .07 
11.2 8.7 9.9 4.27 
5.9 2.4 5.1 9.26 
2.4 - 1,2 - 1.1 .48 
8.1 4. 1 7.0 9.20 
8.2 7.9 8.4 1.72 
- 9.5 -18.1 -18.1 .00 
11.4 13.3 13.5 .09 
- 4.5 -14.7 -14.7 .00 
4.0 1.9 4.6 10.35 
9.4 7.0 10.8 13.85 
17.7 15.7 15.7 .00 
3.3 2.8 4.0 3.68 
16.5 15.6 16.2 2.03 
- 3.7 - 4.2 - 3.1 3.64 
2.6 .9 5.2 13.47 
15.2 16.7 17.8 3.79 
20.1 17.4 17.4 .00 
3.0 3.5 4.0 2.22 
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41 
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59 
60 
59 
PROBABILISTIC/SKEWED BIDDING COMPARISON 
Expected Skewed Bid Skewed Bid 
Bid Payment Exp. Payment Expected 
Basi s Basi s Basi s Savings 
(Profit %) (Profit %) (Profit 7.) ($/MBF) 
10.1 7.6 9.1 4.69 
- 9.5 - 6.4 - 1.9 13.10 
11.2 12.9 12.9 .00 
.2 3.3 6.6 9.83 
8.2 12.0 12.0 .01 
- 8.2 - .7 2.7 13.07 
3.4 6.0 7.4 4.19 
.5 2.5 3.1 2.28 
-12.8 -14.7 -11.2 9.8 
7.6 7.5 7.5 .00 
- 3.3 1.9 7.4 20.34 
3.8 3.4 9.5 19.11 
10.5 14.7 17.3 7.92 
19.0 24.5 24.5 .00 
4.4 9.1 12.3 9.79 
- 8.2 - 8.5 6.6 52.46 
31.6 31.0 31.0 .00 
1.9 - 5.4 10.6 50.60 
-17.6 17.2 17.2 .00 
13.5 5.7 24.9 72.51 
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